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ABSTRACT 
The present paper studies the evolution of the Greek public debt ratio 
under different assumptions regarding the size and the degree of 
persistence of fiscal multiplies, the implementation profile of the applied 
fiscal adjustment and the response of financial markets to fiscal 
consolidation. The main results of our simulation exercise can be 
summarized as follows: a) taking into account Greece’s present debt 
ratio, a fiscal adjustment can lead to a contemporaneous increase in the 
ratio if the fiscal multiplier is higher than ca 0.5; b) despite the 
unprecedented improvement in the underlying fiscal position since 
2010, the concomitant increase in the public debt ratio can be mainly 
attributed to its high initial level, a very wide initial structural deficit as 
well as the ensuing economic recession; c) notwithstanding its negative 
initial effects on domestic economic activity, the enormous fiscal effort 
undertaken over the last 5 years leaves the country’s debt ratio in a 
more sustainable path relative to a range of alternative scenarios 
assuming no adjustment or a more gradual implementation profile of 
fiscal consolidation relative to that implemented thus far. 
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The Challenge of Restoring Debt 
Sustainability in a Deep Economic Recession: 
The case of Greece 
 
1. Introduction 
The large fiscal adjustment undertaken in many advanced economies in 
recent years has stimulated renewed interest in the effects of fiscal 
policy on economic activity. To measure these effects, one needs to 
make an assumption about the size (and the persistence) of fiscal 
multipliers.1 A number of recent empirical studies have demonstrated 
that fiscal multipliers may be significantly higher in economic downturns 
than in expansions (see for instance, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 
2011; Baum and Koester, 2011; Batini et al., 2012; and Blanchard and 
Leigh, 2013). In a nutshell, while the earlier literature suggests an 
average first-year (i.e., impact) fiscal multiplier of around 0.6 for 
advanced economies, there are strong reasons to believe that in the 
current environment the multiplier may be closer to 1 and, in certain 
cases, even higher than that.2   
While a vast volume of theoretical and empirical work exists on the 
effects of fiscal policy on economic activity (albeit with broadly 
inconclusive results), the feedback effect from growth to fiscal 
aggregates, and in particular to government debt, has received less 
attention. This issue is becoming increasingly important at this juncture 
as debt reduction has become a key policy target in a number of 
                                                 
1
 Fiscal multipliers are defined as the ratio of a change in output to an exogenous change in the fiscal 
deficit with respect to their baselines. 
2
 See e.g. a recent literature review by Mineshima et al. (2013).   
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advanced economies. In the EU, new provisions in the Stability and 
Growth Pact require member states with a public debt to GDP ratio 
higher than 60% to act to put it on a downward path so as any excess of 
the ratio over the said threshold decreases by 1/20th on a 3-year rolling 
basis.   
In the case of Greece, an aggressive fiscal consolidation effort has been 
undertaken since the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis and the 
subsequent signing of two consecutive economic stabilization programs. 
This effort has led to a cumulative adjustment of 19.4ppts of GDP in the 
cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance, to a surplus of 5.8%-of-GDP in 
2013, from a deficit of 13.6%-of-GDP in 2009 (IMF, 2014).  Despite this 
unprecedented improvement (and a number of steps taken in 2012 to 
restructure privately-held Greek public debt), the country’s general 
government debt ratio has actually increased by 45.3ppts since 2009, 
reaching 175%-of-GDP at the end of 2013. This development naturally 
raises the question of whether Greece’s fiscal adjustment is actually a 
“self-defeating” proposition, in the sense that the implementation of 
aggressive fiscal consolidation in a depressed economy may erode the 
fiscal balance and worsen debt dynamics on a sustained basis.3   
The specter of self-defeating consolidations was initially raised in Gros 
(2011), where a simple framework was utilized to show that austerity 
could indeed increase the debt ratio in the short-run. However, Gros 
does not examine the impact of repeated episodes of tightening; neither 
does he explore the implications of multiplier persistence, two key 
                                                 
3
 Delong and Summers (2012) argue that under certain conditions even a small amount of 
“hysteresis” – even a small shadow cast on future potential output by the cyclical downturn – means, 
by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing.   
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factors that have been subsequently examined in several empirical and 
are arguably relevant to the Greek case studies (see e.g. European 
Commission, 2012, and Eyraud and Weber, 2013).  
This study presents a simulation exercise for Greece to highlight the 
effects of the applied fiscal austerity program on the debt ratio and 
other important fiscal metrics. The paper employs the stock-flow 
accounting identity, known as intertemporal budget constraint, to study 
the evolution of the Greek public debt ratio under different assumptions 
regarding: a) the size and the degree of persistence of fiscal multiplies; 
b) the size and the implementation profile of the applied fiscal 
adjustment; and c) the response of financial markets to fiscal 
consolidation (myopic vs. forward-looking markets).  
The main results of our study are as follows: (i) other things being equal, 
the chances of a “self-defeating” consolidation increase with the initial 
debt level, the size of the fiscal multiplier and its persistence; (ii) in view 
of Greece’s present elevated debt ratio, a fiscal adjustment can lead to 
an initial (contemporaneous) rise in the debt ratio if the fiscal multiplier 
is higher than ca 0.5; (iii) the chance of self-defeating consolidation also 
increases if financial markets act myopically, by placing a 
disproportionate weight on the initial rise in the debt ratio following a 
fiscal policy tightening; (iv) to a large extent, Greece has been sealed 
from the latter effect, as more than 80% of its public debt is currently 
held by the official sector at concessional interest rates that are likely to 
decrease further following the provision of a new debt relief package by 
official lenders (expected by to the end of 2014); (v)       despite the 
unprecedented improvement in Greece’s underlying fiscal position since 
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2010, the concomitant increase in the country’s public debt ratio can be 
mainly attributed to the ratio’s elevated initial level, a very wide initial 
structural deficit as well as the deep economic recession. The 
aforementioned factors have led to an increase in the debt ratio that is 
likely to prove temporary; and (vi) notwithstanding its negative initial 
effects on domestic economic activity, the enormous fiscal effort 
undertaken in the last 4-5 years leaves the country’s debt ratio in a more 
sustainable path relative to a range of alternative scenarios assuming no 
adjustment or a more gradual implementation profile of fiscal 
consolidation. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review on fiscal multipliers. Section 3 presents some 
unpleasant arithmetic of fiscal consolidations. Section 4 presents the 
main results of our simulation exercise and analyzes their policy 
implications. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  A brief literature review on fiscal multipliers  
2.1. Determinants of fiscal multipliers 
 
Prior theoretical and empirical work on the response of main 
macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous fiscal shocks has shown that 
the size and, in certain instances, the sign of the fiscal multiplier can be 
country-, estimation method-, and economic conditions-specific. In 
general, it appears that quite diverse views continue to exist among 
professional economists and policy makers as regards the quantitative 
and qualitative effects of fiscal policy (see e.g. Perotti, 2004).  
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From a purely theoretical perspective, neoclassical models would predict 
that a positive shock to government spending would lead to a crowding 
out of private consumption, while Keynesian and some neo-Keynesian 
models would predict the opposite effect. To complicate things further, 
uncertainty regarding the size (or even the sign) of the fiscal multiplier in 
developing and emerging markets is even higher, not only because of 
the scarcity of timely and reliable national and government account 
statistics, but also because of a long history of fiscal profligacy and 
sovereign debt crises that have blurred the efficacy of any fiscal 
expansion.   
Based on an extensive literature review on the topic, Spilimbergo et al. 
(2011) provide some stylized facts on the potential size and 
determinants of fiscal multipliers. As per the said study, the size of the 
multiplier is large if: “leakages” are limited i.e., only a small part of the 
fiscal stimulus is channeled to savings or imports; monetary conditions 
are accommodative i.e., a fiscal stimulus does not lead to an increase in 
the interest rate; and the country’s fiscal position is sustainable 
following a fiscal expansion.  
Elaborating further on the aforementioned conditions, the authors 
clarify that leakages are limited if: (i) the propensity to import is 
relatively small, meaning that large closed economies usually feature 
larger multipliers than small open economies with no barriers to trade; 
(ii) the measures mainly target liquidity constrained consumers; that is, 
an exogenous fiscal shock (e.g. increase in government spending) does 
not lead to a rise in precautionary savings by consumers in anticipation 
of higher taxation in the future. That is because liquidity constrained 
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households spend a significant portion of the windfall (e.g. wage 
increase or increased government purchases of goods and services) to 
increase current spending; (iii) domestic economic conditions are 
recessionary and the economy is far from its full employment 
equilibrium; if such conditions prevail, an increase in government 
spending does not necessarily lead to an increase in interest rates that 
could, in turn, crowd out private investment; and (iv) the fiscal stimulus 
has a large spending component, as the initial shock would then have a 
more immediate impact on aggregate demand, while households may 
save part of a tax cut.  An important point to make here is that the above 
condition may not apply to a country featuring an unsustainable fiscal 
position. In that case, an unwarranted fiscal expansion may further 
exacerbate investor worries about fiscal sustainability, leading to a 
further increase in sovereign bond yield spreads and domestic interest 
rates, causing a crowding out of private investment and reducing the 
multiplier.  
Separately, monetary conditions are accommodative if a fiscal shock 
(e.g. increased discretionary government spending) does not put upward 
pressure on the nominal interest rate. On the latter point, a number of 
recent empirical studies have documented that the fiscal multiplier can 
rise by a factor of 2 or 3 if the nominal interest rate is at (or very close 
to) the lower nominal bound of zero percent (a situation akin to the 
Keynesian liquidity trap).   
Other factors potentially influencing the size of the fiscal multiplier 
include the degree of financial market deepening and liberalization as 
well as the broader macroeconomic conditions in the domestic 
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economy. A relatively low degree of financial intermediation usually 
implies that liquidity-constrained households and businesses cannot 
easily borrow to intertemporally smooth consumption and investment 
and thus, a positive fiscal impulse can lead to higher current 
consumption (and less precautionary saving) than otherwise the case. 
Furthermore, heightened macroeconomic uncertainty may induce 
consumers to increase precautionary savings, decrease their marginal 
propensity to consume and thus, reduce the size of the multiplier (see 
e.g. Spilimbergo et al., 2011). That is demonstrated by official U.S. data 
showing that the 2008 tax rebate has been largely saved. At the other 
end of the spectrum, one could convincingly argue that the crisis may 
have actually increased the size of the fiscal multiplier, as the ensuing 
credit crunch has raised the proportion of liquidity-constrained 
households and, furthermore, monetary authorities in major 
industrialized countries have reduced their nominal policy rate towards 
the zero percent bound.  
In view of the ambiguous effects of the recent global economic and 
financial crisis on the size of the fiscal multipliers, Spilimbergo et al. 
(2011) caution against re-estimating the size of the multiplier in the 
present trajectory, on the basis that the crisis may have caused 
structural breaks in relevant date series.  
2.2.  Empirical Studies 
 
Various methodological approaches have been developed to study the 
effect of fiscal policy changes on economic activity. As of today, the most 
promising stand of research which aims to isolate the macroeconomic 
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effects of purely exogenous fiscal policy impulses rely on the structural 
vector-autoregression (SVAR) model, initially proposed by Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002) and extended by Perotti (2004).  
A recent literature review by Mineshima et al, (2013), which updates 
earlier IMF estimates by Spilimbergo and others (2009), finds first-year 
multipliers of about 0.8 for government spending and about 0.3 for 
revenue measures. Since about two-thirds of recent fiscal adjustments in 
advanced economies rely on spending measures, this implies an average 
overall impact multiplier of ca 0.6.4  Overall, many empirical studies 
document a positive response of output to an exogenous government 
spending increase and a negative response of output to an exogenous 
rise in government revenue (higher taxation), with the former exceeding 
the latter in absolute terms.  
It should be noted here that an important limitation of the 
methodological approaches highlighted above is that, by construction, 
they rule-out state-dependent multipliers. Yet, recent empirical work 
has emphasized that government spending multipliers may be larger in 
recessions than in expansions.5 Using an estimation approach similar in 
many respects to the Smooth Transition Autoregressive (STAR) models 
developed in Granger and Teravista (1993), Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2010) estimate spending multipliers that are 
approximately zero in expansions and as high as 2.0 in recessions. Other 
                                                 
4
 However, as noted in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook of October 2012 (Box 1.1, page 41), “The 
main finding, based on data for 28 economies, is that the multipliers used in generating growth 
forecasts have been systematically too low since the start of the Great Recession, by 0.4 to 1.2, 
depending on the forecast source and the specifics of the estimation approach. Informal evidence 
suggests that the multipliers implicitly used to generate these forecasts are about 0.5.  So, actual 
multipliers may be higher, in the range of 0.9 to 1.7”. 
5
 For a discussion on these and other related issues see e.g. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2010).  
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recent studies broadly confirm the existence of sizeable cyclical 
variations of fiscal multipliers. Among others, Bachmann and Sims 
(2011), report that the spending multiplier is approximately zero in 
expansions and approximately 3 in recessions. Separately, Shoag (2010) 
examines state-level variation in government spending and finds that 
the multiplier is approximately 3.0-3.5 when labor markets have a slack 
(recession) and approximately 1.5 when there is no slack (expansion). 
These findings seem to be in agreement with earlier Keynesian 
arguments in favor of using discretionary fiscal policy in recessionary 
periods to stimulate aggregate demand. Intuitively, when the economy 
has a slack, expansionary government spending shocks are less likely to 
crowd out private consumption or investment.  
For Greece, empirical estimation of fiscal multipliers has long been 
constrained by the lack of available macroeconomic and fiscal data. In a 
recent paper, Monokroussos and Thomakos (2012) utilize actual (not 
interpolated) quarterly general government data reported by Eurostat 
(relevant series dated back to Q1 1999) to estimate the size of fiscal 
multipliers in expansionary and contractionary output phases. The study 
employs the classic SVAR approach to estimate output responses to 
discretionary fiscal shocks. It also presents a variant of the Smooth 
Transition Vector Autoregression (STVAR) model presented in Auerbach 
and Gorodnichenko (2011) to investigate the time- and regime-
dependent properties of Greece’s fiscal multiplies. The main results of 
the study are as follows: (i) SVAR model estimates indicate government 
spending multipliers that are not far away from these estimated for 
Greece in a number of earlier empirical studies i.e., multipliers in the 
vicinity of 0.5; (ii) the STVAR model estimates strongly significant 
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government spending multipliers that are as high as 1.32 in recessionary 
phases along with negative (and broadly insignificant) multipliers for 
periods of economic expansion; and (iii) the latter finding is particularly 
pronounced for government wage expenditure, where the estimated 
multiplier is found to be as high as 2.35 (and strongly significant) in 
recessionary regimes and negative (and largely insignificant) in economic 
expansions.  
In a more recent study, Monokroussos and Thomakos (2013) employ a 
Multivariate Threshold Autoregressive Model (TVAR) that has a number 
of unique features that make it particularly suitable for estimating 
regime-dependent fiscal multipliers for various important government 
expenditure and revenue categories. Their main results are as follows: (i) 
the response of real output to discretionary shocks in government 
current spending on goods and services and/or government tax revenue 
depends on the regime in which the shock occurs as well as on the size 
and direction (expansionary vs. contractionary) of the initial shock; (ii) In 
general, expansionary or contractionary shocks taking place in lower 
output regimes (economic downturns) appear to have much larger 
effects on output - both on impact and on a cumulative basis -  than 
shocks of similar sign and size occurring in upper regimes (economic 
expansions); (iii) in lower regimes in particular, the contractionary 
effects on output from a negative fiscal shock (spending cut or tax hike) 
rise with the absolute size of the shock. In the same vein, the 
expansionary effects on output from a positive fiscal shock (spending 
hike or tax cut) increase with the absolute size of the shock. Similar 
effects apply for fiscal shock taking place in an upper output regime, 
though to a much lesser extent.   
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3. Some unpleasant arithmetic of fiscal consolidation  
 
3.1  Why fiscal consolidation can lead to an initial rise in the debt ratio 
In the absence of stock-flow adjustments, the government debt-to-GDP 
ratio evolves according to the following (approximate) formula6:  
bt = bt-1(1+rt – gt) – pbalt                       (1)                                                            
where t is the time subscript (years); bt is the public debt to GDP ratio in 
year t; pbal is the primary budget balance to GDP ratio; g represents 
nominal GDP growth; and r is the average nominal effective interest rate 
on debt. In our study, the latter variable is proxied by the ratio of total 
interest expenditure in year t over the public debt stock of year t-1.  
By definition, the general government balance is the sum of a cyclical 
component and a structural component:  
balt = cabt + cbt                                                                                                                                        (2)
           
where cab is the cyclically adjusted general government balance and cb 
is the cyclical component of the balance. The cyclical component varies 
proportionally to the percentage difference of GDP to the respective 
                                                 
6 The formula is derived from the identity Bt = Bt-1 (1+rt-1) – PBalt, where Bt depicts gross public debt in 
nominal terms. Dividing both sides of the equation by nominal GDP, Yt, we get 
 
.    
The latter can be rewritten as   
and approximating  with  we derive the formula in the text.  
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baseline, with a coefficient equal to the semi-elasticity of budget 
balance, ε.7       
In line with Boussard et al. (2012) and others8, the size of the annual 
structural fiscal effort is represented by the annual change in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance. Therefore, a permanent fiscal 
consolidation (or expansion) in year t constitutes a change in cabt that 
remains constant (with respect to the baseline) throughout all years 
onwards.  
The fiscal multiplier, mt, of year t is defined as the ratio of nominal GDP 
over a decrease (increase) in the cyclically adjusted primary balance9:  
mt ≡                                                                                       (3) 
                               
where, d is the first-differencing operator, Y represents GDP in levels and 
CAPB is the cyclically adjusted primary budget balance in levels.  
                                                 
7 The EU fiscal framework uses a standard "two-step methodology", which consists in computing the 
cyclical component of the budget first and then subtracting it from the actual budget balance. In 
algebraic terms cabt = balt − cbt, where bal stands for the nominal budget balance to GDP ratio and cb 
for its cyclical component (European Commission, 2013). The determination of the cyclical component 
of balances in the EU methodology requires two inputs: i) a measure of the cyclical position of the 
economy (the output gap, ogt) and ii) a measure of the link between the economic cycle and the 
budget (cyclical-adjustment budgetary parameter). The product of the two measures gives the cyclical 
component of the budget, cbt = ε∗ogt, which is then subtracted from the headline budget-to-GDP 
ratio to obtain the cab. 
 
8
 See e.g. European Commission (2012, 2013) 
9
 As we have noted already, fiscal multiplier is defined as the ratio of a change in output to an 
exogenous change in the fiscal deficit with respect to their corresponding baselines. In the formula 
presented in the text we divide by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance CAPB in order 
to disentangle the effects of automatic stabilizers i.e., the feedback effect from the change in output 
on the fiscal balance. Moreover, we implicitly assume that the change in CAPB is orthogonal to the 
state of the macroeconomy, an assumption crucial for the identification of exogenous fiscal shocks. 
Such an assumption is central to the identification approach followed in the standard fiscal SVAR 
framework introduced by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and extended by Perotti (2004), albeit at 
quarterly time frequencies.  
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From equations (1)-(3) and after some arithmetic manipulations,10 it can 
be shown that a fiscal consolidation in year t leads to a 
contemporaneous increase in the debt ratio (i.e.,   ≥ 0) if the 
following condition is met:  
 mt ≥                                                                             (4) 
which, for a small g can be approximated by the following formula:  
mt ≥                                                                                              (4.1)  
For the case of Greece, taking as a reference ratio the country’s 
Maastricht debt ratio of 2011 (170.3% of GDP) and a budgetary semi-
elasticity of 0.43 (see European Commission, 2012), the critical value of 
the fiscal multiplier that prevents a (contemporaneous) rise in the debt 
ratio following a fiscal adjustment in year t is around 0.47. In other 
words, a fiscal adjustment undertaken in year t (here, t=2011) would 
lead to an initial rise in the debt ratio if the size of the fiscal multiplier in 
that year is equal or greater than 0.47. 
3.2 Multiplier persistence 
As we have explained in the previous section, fiscal consolidations may 
have negative short-run repercussions not only for economic activity but 
also for aggregate fiscal metrics, especially in the presence of a high 
initial debt ratio and fiscal multipliers significantly higher than these 
documented in early studies. To get a clearer understanding of the 
effects of fiscal austerity on the debt ratio, let us consider the following 
                                                 
10
 See e.g. Boussard et al. (2012).  
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(approximate) relation, which under certain simplifying assumptions 
describes the contemporaneous (i.e., first year) change in the debt ratio 
following a 1 percent of GDP consolidation relative to a given baseline11:  
Δ(debt_ratio)*100 ≈ -1 + multiplier*debt_ratio + 
multiplier*revenue_ratio                                                                           (5) 
In equation (5) above, the first term (-1) in the right-hand side 
represents the (positive) direct effect of fiscal consolidation that 
improves one-to-one the primary fiscal budget and thus, it has a 
reducing effect on the debt ratio. However, this positive impact is 
partially offset (and, in certain instances, more than outweighed) by the 
effects of declining output on government revenues through the 
interplay of automatic stabilizers; this (numerator) effect is represented 
by the last term on the right-hand side of the above equation i.e., 
multiplier*revenue_ratio. In addition to that, the decline in economic 
activity following fiscal tightening reduces the denominator of debt-to-
GDP, exerting an increasing effect on the said ratio; the latter effect is 
represented by the second term in the right-hand side of equation (5) 
and it is known as the denominator effect.   
For a country featuring a debt ratio of, say, 100%, a revenue ratio of 40% 
and a fiscal multiplier of 0.6, a discretionary fiscal tightening of 1ppt-of-
GDP lowers the debt ratio (relative to the no-policy-change baseline) by 
only 0.16% of GDP in the first year. That is, assuming all others factors 
remaining unchanged. In the case of Greece, given the country’s current 
debt ratio (ca. 175%-of-GDP at the end of 2013) and the present general 
government revenue ratio (ca. 44%-of-GDP), a fiscal multiplier of, say, 1 
                                                 
11
 See Eyraud and Weber (2013).  
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means that a fiscal tightening of 1ppt-of-GDP would actually increase the 
debt ratio by 0.45 ppts-of-GDP (relative to the baseline of no 
consolidation) in the year that the fiscal consolidation is implemented. In 
more general terms, the aforementioned analysis suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, the chances of a self-defeating consolidation increase, with the 
initial debt level, the size of the multiplier and its persistence.   
Note that the analysis above describes the contemporaneous (i.e., same 
year) dynamics of the debt ratio following a 1ppt of GDP fiscal 
consolidation, under the assumption of a constant average effective 
interest rate on the overall debt stock. But, what happens if the effects 
of fiscal consolidation on output persist beyond the year that fiscal 
consolidation is implemented? What if one assumes that financial 
markets react in a certain way to a discretionary fiscal policy change e.g. 
myopically, by concentrating only on the initial rise in the debt ratio (and 
thus, demanding a higher risk premium in holding the country’s debt) or, 
alternatively, in a more normal i.e., forward looking manner, by 
demanding a lower risk premium on sovereign debt and thus, 
compressing the sovereign bond yield spreads?  Finally, what happens in 
the case of repeated consolidations, a situation more akin to the Greek 
case, given the huge fiscal consolidation implemented over the last 5 
years?  In the following sections, we will attempt to shed some light on 
these and other related issues.  
3.3  Market reaction to fiscal consolidation 
From the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (1) that describes 
debt dynamics, it is apparent that the debt ratio increases with the 
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nominal effective interest rate on debt. Thus, assuming that the initial 
(year t-1) debt ratio is 100% of GDP, the average nominal effective 
interest rate on debt is 4.50%, nominal GDP growth in year t is 0.0% and 
the primary fiscal balance is 0.0% of GDP, then in the absence of stock-
flow adjustments, the rise in the debt ratio in year t will be 4.5ppts of 
GDP. This simple arithmetic example demonstrates the importance of 
market reaction to a fiscal consolidation, especially in cases where fiscal 
adjustment leads to an initial rise in the debt ratio. To address this issue, 
the recent literature distinguishes between myopic markets and more 
normal i.e., forward looking markets, depending on the sovereign bond 
yield sensitivity to the thrust of the fiscal consolidation effort and the 
subsequent change in the debt ratio.  
In order to take account of these influences, Boussard et al. (2012) 
parameterize the change in the average effective interest rate on debt 
as follows: 
                              (6) 
where d(rt)/d(capbt) depicts the change in the average effective interest 
rate on debt per one unit change in the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal 
balance-to-GDP ratio, μ is the yield sensitivity to fiscal consolidation and 
γ is the yield sensitivity to the debt ratio in year t+h (for h ≥ 1). Here, 
parameter h, the horizon of financial markets, plays a key role. In 
particular, h =1 and γ>0 indicate that markets exhibit a high degree of 
myopia by concentrating on the initial rise in the debt ratio following 
consolidation and thus demanding a higher risk premium for holding the 
country’s sovereign debt. On the other hand, for cases where μ <0, γ>0 
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and h is much higher than 1, markets behave in a more normal (i.e., 
forward-looking) manner, by concentrating on the longer-term fiscal 
consolidation impact on the debt ratio and thus demanding a lower risk 
premium. Overall, the analysis presented above suggests that the 
chances of self-defeating consolidation increase if financial markets act 
myopically, by placing a disproportionate weight on the initial rise in the 
debt ratio following a fiscal policy tightening.  
In the case of Greece, it is important to note that, to a large extent, the 
country has been sealed from the aforementioned effects, as more than 
80% of its public debt is currently held by the official sector at 
concessional interest rates that are expected to decrease further 
following a new debt relief package (expected before the end of 2014).     
3.4 Hysteresis 
Delong and Summers (2012) suggest that in a depressed economy even 
a small amount of “hysteresis” - i.e., a small impact on potential output 
due to the economic downturn – means, by simple arithmetic, that 
expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing.  Although the 
authors clarify that their argument “does not justify unsustainable fiscal 
policies, nor does it justify delaying the passage of legislation to make 
unsustainable fiscal policies sustainable” it is clear that the notion of 
hysteresis takes particular importance for fiscal consolidations 
undertaken during deep economic downturns, where multipliers are 
likely to be both high and persistent i.e., their recessionary effects 
stretch well beyond the year that fiscal adjustment is applied.  In the 
following section we present the results of a simulation exercise for 
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Greece, which takes into account the potential effects of some on the 
aforementioned factors on the evolution of the country’s public debt 
ratio.  
4.  The case of Greece: a simulation exercise   
This section presents a simulation exercise, which aims to measure the 
effects on public debt of the fiscal austerity measures that have been 
implemented in Greece since 2010; and to evaluate the chances of “self-
defeating” consolidation. The results of the simulation exercise (and a 
brief description of underling scenarios) are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. 
Furthermore, Table 1 (Appendix 1) shows the evolution of Greek public 
debt over the period 2011-2030 under a macroeconomic scenario which 
broadly evolves in line with the revised troika debt sustainability analysis 
for Greece12 and also assumes that a new debt relief package (OSI) is 
provided before the end of 2014. In our exercise, the latter is assumed 
to incorporate: i) a 20-year extension in the average maturity of EU 
bilateral loans disbursed to Greece in the context of the 1st adjustment 
program (GLF); ii) a further reduction of the interest rate charged on 
these loans (to 0.6% fixed, from 3m euribor + 50bps, currently); and iii) a 
10 year deferral of GLF interest payments.13  The reason for 
incorporating the above relief structure in our analysis is to ensure that 
the revised official targets for the debt ratio in 2020 and 2022 (around 
                                                 
12
 European Commission (April 2014) and IMF (July 2013).  
13 A more detailed analysis on this debt relief structure is provided in Greece Macro Monitor, “The 
economic and market significance of the new 5-year government bond issue- Resumed market access 
and a new debt relief package will greatly lessen the need for additional official sector financing”, 
Eurobank Global Markets Research, April 15, 2014.  
http://www.eurobank.gr/Uploads/Reports/GREECE_MACRO_FOCUS_April15_2014_5Y_Bond_issue.p
df 
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125% of GDP and 112% of GDP, respectively) are met, under the 
assumed baseline macro scenario.  
Both Figures 1 and 2 below assume that 2010 is the first year that fiscal 
consolidation is implemented and thus, all relevant variables take their 
realized values for the year 2009.14  Specifically, for year t0 = 2009 it is 
assumed that the general government primary fiscal deficit equals 10.5% 
of GDP; the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal deficit equals 13.6% of 
(potential) GDP; the nominal effective interest rate on debt equals 4.5%; 
nominal GDP growth equals -0.9%; and the debt to GDP ratio equals 
129.8% (b0 = 129.8%). 
Our exercise also examines two initial values for the first-year (impact) 
multiplier; namely -1.5 “high multiplier” and -0.5 “low multiplier”, while 
persistence is incorporated in our simulation framework by assuming 
that the multiplier follows the convex, autoregressive decaying path 
analyzed in Appendix 2. In our simulation, “high persistence” 
corresponds to the following parameter values: α=0.8 & β=0; and “low 
persistence” to the following values: α=0.5 & β=-0.2. Finally, the 
simulation scenarios presented in Figures 1 & 2 assume a budgetary 
semi-elasticity with respect to GDP equal to 0.43. 
In more detail, Figure 1 simulates the path of Greek public debt ratio 
over the period 2010-2020 assuming that: nominal GDP growth evolves 
in line with potential GDP growth (realized and projected); the average 
nominal interest rate on debt is fixed at its 2009 realized value (4.50%) 
throughout the entire projection horizon (2010-2020); other debt 
creating flows (besides the snowball effect and the change in the 
                                                 
14
 European Commission (April 2014) and IMF Fiscal Monitor (April 2014).  
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primary balance) are assumed to be fixed at 0.0% of GDP from 2010 
onwards; and there are varying degrees of fiscal adjustment, identified 
by the assumed path of the annual change in the cyclically-adjusted 
primary fiscal balance. These paths are briefly described below (see also 
Box A beneath Figure 1):   
Scenario 0 - “Counterfactual - high-multiplier / high persistence” 
assumes no fiscal consolidation from 2010 onwards (i.e., annual change 
in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance = 0.0% of GDP). 
Scenario 1- “Full - frontloaded adjustment - high-multiplier / high 
persistence” assumes that Greece timely implements the full 
adjustment (realized and projected) envisaged in its present bailout 
program (i.e., annual change in the cyclically-adjusted primary balance 
evolves in line with the program’s present baseline scenario).  
Scenario 2 - “Partial adjustment - high multiplier / high persistence” 
assumes annual changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance in 
2010-2016 that are half the size of these assumed in the baseline (i.e., 
Scenario 1); from 2017 onwards, respective annual changes are assumed 
to be equal to these envisaged in Scenario 1. 
Scenario 3 - “Gradual adjustment 1 - high multiplier / high persistence” 
assumes annual changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance in 
2010-2016 that are equal to the arithmetic average of the cumulative 
size of fiscal effort assumed in Scenario 1; from 2017 onwards, 
respective annual changes are assumed to be the same with these 
envisaged in Scenario 1. 
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Scenario 4 - “Gradual adjustment 2 - high multiplier / high persistence” 
assumes that the cumulative change in the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance in 2010-2016 that materializes in Scenario 1 is now taking place 
(equiproportionally) over a longer implementation horizon (i.e., over the 
period 2010-2023); Note that Scenarios 2 to 4 above can be 
conceptualized  in the a hypothetical environment characterized by e.g. 
increased social unrest and/or an inability/unwillingness of the domestic 
political system to implement an aggressive consolidation program so as 
to swiftly correct sizeable long-standing fiscal imbalances.  
Scenario 5 - “Full  frontloaded adjustment - high-multiplier / low 
persistence” is the same as Scenario 1, assuming instead a high impact 
multiplier value and low persistence.  
Scenario 6 - “Full  frontloaded adjustment - low multiplier / low 
persistence” is the same as Scenario 1, assuming instead a low impact 
multiplier value and low persistence. 
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Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP ratio evolution, under different fiscal adjustment scenarios 
using potential GDP growth as the baseline  
 
Source: EC (April 2014); IMF (April 2014); Eurobank Global Markets Research.  
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Box A - Assumptions and scenarios for the analysis of Figure 1 
Year t0 = 2009 assumptions: General government primary fiscal deficit equals 10.5% of GDP; Cyclically 
adjusted primary fiscal deficit equals 13.6% of (potential) GDP; Nominal effective interest rate on debt equals 
4.5%; Nominal GDP growth equals -0.9%; Debt ratio equals 129.8% (b0 = 129.8%). 
Multiplier and automatic stabilizer assumptions: Impact multiplier values: “high” = -1.5; “low” = -0.5; 
Multiplier persistence parameter values”: “high persistence” (α = 0.8; β=-0.2); “low persistence” (α = 0.5; 
β=0); Primary balance semi-elasticity with respect to GDP equals 0.43 (see European Commission, 2013). 
Scenario 0 - “Counterfactual_ high-multiplier / high persistence” 
 Nominal GDP growth = Potential GDP growth (realized & projected) 
2010-2015: in line with IMF WEO (April 2014); FY-2020: in line with IMF’s 4
th
 review of Greek program 
(July 2013); 2015-2020: gradual convergence towards 2020 value; 
 Annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., our proxy for the size of fiscal effort) equals 
0.0% from 2010 onwards (no fiscal adjustment scenario); 
 Average nominal interest rate on debt fixed at FY-2009 realized value (4.50%) from 2010 onwards; 
 Other debt creating flows (besides the snowball effect and the change in the primary balance) are 
assumed to be fixed at 0.0% of GDP from 2010 onwards. 
 
Scenario 1 - “Full_ frontloaded adjustment_ high-multiplier / high persistence” 
 Nominal GDP growth (before incorporating fiscal multiplier impact) = Potential GDP growth; 
 Annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., our proxy for the size of fiscal effort) assumed 
to evolve in line with IMF’s (WEO April 2014) realizations and projections (full fiscal adjustment 
scenario); 
 Average nominal interest rate on debt fixed at FY-2009 realized value (4.50%); 
 Other debt creating flows are assumed to be fixed at 0.0% of GDP from 2010 onwards. 
 
Scenario 2 - “Partial adjustment_ high multiplier / high persistence” 
 Annual changes in cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., our proxy for the size of fiscal effort) in 2010-
2016 are assumed to be half of these assumed in Scenario 1; from 2017 onwards, respective annual 
changes are assumed to be equal to these envisaged in Scenario 1; 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 3 - “Gradual adjustment 1_ high multiplier / high persistence” 
 Annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., our proxy for the size of fiscal effort) in 2010-
2016 is assumed to be equal to the arithmetic average of the cumulative size of fiscal effort assumed in 
Scenario 1; from 2017 onwards, respective annual changes are assumed to be the same with these 
envisaged under Scenario 1; 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 4 - “Gradual adjustment 2_ high multiplier / high persistence” 
 Cumulative change in cyclically adjusted primary balance in 2010-2016 under Scenario 1 is here assumed 
to take place (equiproportionally) over a longer implementation horizon (i.e., over the period 2010-
2023); 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario 1. 
 
Scenario 5 - “Full_ frontloaded adjustment_ high-multiplier / low  persistence” 
 Same as Scenario 1, with “low” multiplier persistence parameter values. 
 
Scenario 6 - “Full_ frontloaded adjustment_ low multiplier / low  persistence” 
 Same as Scenario 1, with “low” impact multiplier value and “low” multiplier persistence parameters. 
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The graphical depiction of the aforementioned scenarios in Figure 1 
suggests that despite an initial (temporary) rise in the debt ratio under 
full frontloaded adjustment (above the levels envisaged in all other 
scenarios), the former is clearly superior from a fiscal sustainability 
perspective, as all other scenarios lead to either explosive debt dynamics 
or a stabilization of the debt ratio at much higher levels relative to the 
baseline.  
A similar conclusion is drawn from the inspection of Figure 2, with the 
main difference now being that the latter incorporates different 
assumptions as regards GDP growth (realized and projected).  
Specifically, Figure 2 incorporates the same assumptions as Figure 1 as 
regards: a) the initial values of all relevant variables in year 2009; b) 
impact multipliers and persistence parameters; and c) fiscal adjustment 
paths. However, the main difference with the scenarios presented in the 
previous table is that Figure 2 incorporates the realized GDP values 
(2010-2013) and the GDP projections envisaged in Greece’s present 
economic adjustment program. This effectively renders our baseline “full 
adjustment” scenario in Figure 2 tantamount to the present baseline 
DSA scenario of the Greek adjustment program (European Commission, 
2014). Note also that all alternative scenarios (i.e., other than the “full 
adjustment” baseline) assume similar paths for the nominal effective 
interest rate and stock-flow adjustments with these envisaged under the 
baseline. The only exception to this is the “No adjustment nominal IR on 
debt fixed at 2009 level” scenario, which instead assumes that the 
average interest rate on debt is fixed at its 2009 value (4.50%) 
throughout the entire projection horizon.  
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These assumptions effectively benefit (to a significant degree) all 
alternative no-full-adjustment scenarios, as they allow them to take 
advantage of the effects of e.g. the PSI+ and the debt buyback operation 
conducted in 2012. They also allow them to benefit from the 
concessional rates on official loans provided to Greece after the country 
fulfilled major prior actions and milestones in the context of its 
adjustment programs. Another alternative scenario (not shown in Figure 
2) incorporating realized and projected market rates and bond yield 
spreads, leads to an even steeper explosive path for the debt ratio than 
these depicted by the no consolidation scenarios in Figure 2.  
Figure 2.  Debt-to-GDP ratio evolution, under different fiscal adjustment scenarios 
using the GDP growth of the revised Greek adjustment program as baseline  
 
 
 Source: EC (April 2014); IMF (April 2014); Eurobank Global Markets Research   
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Box B - Assumptions and scenarios for the analysis of Figure 2 
Year t0 = 2009 assumptions: General government primary fiscal deficit equals 10.5% of GDP;   Cyclically 
adjusted primary fiscal deficit equals 13.6% of (potential) GDP; Nominal effective interest rate on debt equals 
4.5%; Nominal GDP growth equals -0.9%; Debt ratio equals 129.8% (b0 = 129.8%). 
Multiplier assumptions: Impact multiplier values: “high” = -1.5 in 2010-2015; “low” = -0.5, from 2016 
onwards; Multiplier persistence parameter values”: “high persistence” (α = 0.8; β=-0.2) in 2010-2015; “low 
persistence” (α = 0.5; β=0) from 2016 onwards.     
Automatic stabilizer assumption:  Primary balance semi-elasticity with respect to GDP equals 0.43 (see also 
European Commission, 2013). 
Scenario o - “Full adjustment”  
 Underlying assumptions same as in Greece’s present economic adjustment program baseline scenario 
(see also European Commission, 2013). 
Scenario 1 - “No adjustment_ nominal IR on debt assumed fixed at 2009 level”  
 No fiscal consolidation in 2010-2020 (i.e., annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance assumed 
equal to 0.0%); 
 Nominal GDP growth in 2010-2020 calculated by extracting from baseline scenario (Scenario 0) the 
effects of fiscal consolidation assumed in Scenario 0; 
 Average nominal interest rate on debt fixed at FY-2009 realized value (4.50%) from 2010 onwards; 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario 0.  
Scenario 2 - “No adjustment_ debt refinancing at concessional rates” 
 No fiscal consolidation in 2010-2020 (i.e., annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance assumed 
equal to 0.0%); 
 Nominal GDP growth in 2010-2020 calculated by extracting from baseline scenario (Scenario 0) the 
effects of fiscal consolidation assumed in Scenario 0; 
 Evolution of annual average nominal interest rate on debt assumed equal to that envisaged in Scenario 0 
(baseline);  
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario 0.  
Scenario 3 - “Partial adjustment”  
 Annual changes in cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., our proxy for the size of fiscal effort) in 2010-
2016 are assumed to be half of these assumed in Scenario 0; from 2017 onwards, respective annual 
changes are assumed to be equal to these envisaged in Scenario 0; 
 Nominal GDP growth in 2010-2020 calculated by extracting from “No adjustment” scenario (Scenario 1) 
the effects of fiscal consolidation assumed in Scenario 3; 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario 0.  
 
Scenario 4 - “Gradual adjustment 1”  
 Annual change in cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., our proxy for the size of fiscal effort) in 2010-
2016 is assumed to be equal to the arithmetic average of the cumulative size of fiscal effort assumed in 
Scenario 0; from 2017 onwards, respective annual changes are assumed to be the same with these 
envisaged under Scenario 0; 
 Nominal GDP growth in 2010-2020 calculated by extracting from “No adjustment” scenario (Scenario 1) 
the effects of fiscal consolidation assumed in Scenario 4; 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario o.  
Scenario 5 - “Gradual adjustment 2”  
 Cumulative change in cyclically adjusted primary balance in 2010-2016 under Scenario 0 is here assumed 
to take place (equiproportionally) over a longer implementation horizon (i.e., over the period 2010-
2023); 
 Nominal GDP growth in 2010-2020 calculated by extracting from “No adjustment” scenario (Scenario 1) 
the effects of fiscal consolidation assumed in Scenario 5; 
 All other assumptions same as in Scenario o.  
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5. Concluding remarks 
This study presents a simulation exercise for Greece to highlight the 
effects of the applied fiscal austerity program on the debt ratio and 
other important fiscal metrics. The paper employs the stock-flow 
accounting identity, known as the intertemporal budget constraint, to 
study the evolution of the Greek public debt ratio under different 
assumptions regarding the size and the degree of persistence of fiscal 
multiplies, the size and the implementation profile of the applied fiscal 
adjustment as well as the response of financial markets to fiscal 
consolidation.  
The main results of the study are summarized below: 
a) in view of Greece’s present elevated debt ratio, a fiscal adjustment 
can lead to an initial (contemporaneous) rise in the debt ratio if the fiscal 
multiplier is higher than around 0.5;  
b) despite the unprecedented improvement in Greece’s underlying fiscal 
position since 2010, the concomitant increase in the country’s public 
debt ratio can be mainly attributed to the ratio’s elevated initial level, a 
very wide initial structural deficit as well as the ensuing economic 
recession; and 
c) notwithstanding its negative initial effects on domestic economic 
activity, the enormous fiscal effort undertaken in the last 4-5 years 
leaves the country’s debt ratio in a more sustainable path relative to a 
range of alternative scenarios assuming no adjustment or a more 
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gradual implementation profile of fiscal consolidation relative to that 
implemented thus far. 
Although an assessment of the optimal mix of fiscal austerity measures 
for Greece is beyond the scope of this paper, our analysis suggests that 
the front-loading nature of the applied adjustment program has been 
instrumental in stabilizing debt dynamics, especially as the attainment of 
a primary surplus in the general government accounts in FY- 2013 opens 
the door for the provision of a new debt relief package by official 
lenders. As discussed in the paper, the said package is expected to 
involve further interest rate reductions and loan maturity extensions so 
as to facilitate fulfilment of the official targets for the public debt to GDP 
ratio (i.e., ca 124% in 2020 and110% or lower in 2022) and a further 
reduction of medium-term borrowing needs.  
In addition, forward-looking markets have applauded the unprecedented 
fiscal adjustment Greece has undertaken since the inception of its 
stabilization program (cumulative improvement in the structural primary 
balance in excess of 19ppts-of-GDP), compressing the 10-year Greek 
Government Bond/German Bund yield spread to ca 420bps in mid-June 
2014, from a record of around 3,550bps reached in early 2012. This has 
allowed the country to re-access financial markets with as many as two 
sovereign debt issues earlier this year (€3bn of 5-year bonds and €1.5bn 
of 3-year bonds), as perceived “GREXIT” risks have retreated 
precipitously since late 2012.   
The sharp compression of sovereign risk premia has also allowed a 
number of Greek corporations to raise market funding from abroad at a 
reasonable prices, relaxing the borrowing constraints they have been 
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facing in the domestic market and setting the ground for a resumption 
of domestic investment activity.  
True, one can convincingly argue that the implementation of aggressive 
fiscal austerity has exacerbated the domestic recession (cumulative 
output losses in excess of 25ppts over the last six years), not least 
because recent empirical evidence suggests that fiscal multipliers tend 
increase in periods of deep economic contractions.  However, in the 
absence of an ambitious (and front-loaded) fiscal adjustment program it 
would be rather impossible to stabilize investor sentiment towards 
Greece and correct severe macroeconomic imbalances accumulated in 
the period leading to the global financial crisis.  
Looking ahead, one of the biggest challenges facing the country is to 
maintain fiscal discipline and complete the program of structural 
reforms in public administration and the domestic product and services 
markers agreed with its official lenders, so as to facilitate a return to 
sustainable and more balanced economic growth.   
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Appendix 1 - Underlying assumptions  
Table A.1. Evolution of gross public debt ratio & underlying assumptions  
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Gross public debt (% GDP) 170.2 157.2 175.0 177.1 172.1 162.2 151.7 142.1 132.7 124.3
Nominal public debt (EUR bn) 354.8 303.9 318.7 322.1 323.3 319.5 313.2 307.3 300.6 293.7
Memorandoum items
Real GDP Growth -7.2 -7.0 -3.9 0.6 2.9 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.6
GDP deflator inflation 1.2 -0.3 -2.1 -0.7 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.7
Primary fiscal balance (% GDP) -2.4 -1.3 0.8 1.6 3.0 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.2
Nominal interest rate on debt (%) 4.6 2.7 2.4 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5
Nominal GDP (EURbn) 208.5 193.3 182.1 181.9 187.9 196.9 206.4 216.2 226.5 236.3
2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Gross public debt (% GDP) 117.9 112.6 107.9 103.7 100.1 96.2 92.6 89.2 85.8 82.4
Nominal public debt (EUR bn) 289.7 287.6 286.3 286.1 286.8 286.6 286.8 287.0 287.2 286.7
Memorandoum items
Real GDP Growth 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
GDP deflator inflation 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Primary fiscal balance (% GDP) 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Nominal interest rate on debt (%) 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.7
Nominal GDP (EURbn) 245.7 255.3 265.4 275.8 286.7 298.0 309.7 321.9 334.6 347.8  
Source: EC (April 2014); IMF (June 2014); Eurobank Global Markets Research  
Note: Scenario assumes implementation of new debt relief package involving: a) 20-year 
maturity extension of GLF loans; b) reducing of interest rate on GLF loans from 3m + 
50bps currently to 0.6% fixed; 10-year grace on GLF interest payments   
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Appendix 2 - Multiplier persistence  
 
In order to incorporate multiplier persistence in our simulation exercise 
we follow Boussard et al. (2012) and European Commission (2012, 2013) 
and assume that fiscal multipliers follow the following convex, 
autoregressive decay path15:  
mt,i = (m1 – β)α
i-t + β   
where, m1 is the impact (i.e., first year) multiplier, mt,I is the fiscal 
multiplier applying in year i following a permanent fiscal shock in year t,  
0 <α < 1; and no assumption made on the sign of β i.e., the long-run 
impulse response of GDP to fiscal consolidation. Α negative value of β 
indicates that “hysteresis” effects are present (see e.g. de Long and 
Summers, 2012). A positive one represents a situation in which a 
consolidation today boosts long term growth by e.g. reducing the 
interest rate and by lessening the crowding out on private investment.   
The graph below depicts the decaying path of the fiscal multiplier 
assumed in the simulation exercise presented in this study. Herein, the 
initial value of the (impact) multiplier is assumed to take one of the 
following two values: -1.5 “high multiplier” and -0.5 “low multiplier”. 
Moreover, “high persistence” corresponds to the following parameter 
values: α=ο.8 & β=-0.2; and “low persistence” to the following values: 
α=ο.5 & β=-0.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 This decay function reproduces relatively well the shape of the impulse-response function by typical 
DSGE models for most of the permanents fiscal shocks.  
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Figure A.1. Response of GDP to one-off cyclical adjustment 
 
Source: EC (September 2013); Eurobank Global Markets Research  
Notes: Response of GDP in years t=1,…,21 per one unit cut in cyclically adjusted primary 
balance in year t=1. 
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